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Abstract.
From the “right to be left alone” to a “commodity” that can be
traded and exchanged, privacy has been defined many ways over the
ages. However, there is still no consensus on one definition. Ambi-
ent Intelligence (AmI) systems power context aware, personalized,
adaptive and anticipatory services. In such systems, privacy plays a
critical role. The human-centered quality of AmI systems has thus
prompted the use of a new kind of technology, called Privacy En-
hancing Technologies (PET). Furthermore, it has now been propose
to include privacy at the onset of such system design. In this sur-
vey paper, we raise the question of which specific privacy issues are
raised in AmI environments and how they are addressed. We use a
literature review in the fields of law, ethics, social sciences and com-
puter sciences. We then proceed with critical discussions. We illus-
trate our research with a use case from Luxembourg HotCity.
1 Introduction
Many definitions of privacy are proposed, none universally accepted.
Privacy is assumed to be a culturally and species-related right [36].
Meanwhile, the debate about privacy issues is steadily growing,
partly due to information technology [17]. Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies (PET) are being developed by academia and industry [44].
Moreover, with privacy by design, privacy requirements should be
taken into account at the early stage of a system design, as they po-
tentially impact on the overall system architecture [35]. Addition-
ally, the increasing pervasiveness of technology into our everyday
lives threatens with a potential dependance on Ambient Intelligence
(AmI) smart systems.
AmI, also referred to as Ubiquitous Computing and Pervasive
Computing, is the Artificial Intelligence field focused on modeling,
processing and even altering the context of a so-called “smart” space.
The definition of this context is fundamental to the AmI system. Gen-
erally a context includes any available knowledge that can be used to
describe the current environment of the system. Privacy is influenced
by context [9, 19]. There are situational aspects of AmI environments
that trigger different privacy concerns for different people. The em-
phasis is on human factors, and since AmI systems focus on assisting
humans in their everyday life, privacy concerns have to be taken into
consideration at the onset on system design.
AmI is set apart from other computer science domains by six
specific properties: ubiquity, invisibility, sensing, memory amplifi-
cation, profiling and connectedness [31, 7]. Furthermore, six basic
principles, based on a set of fair information practices common in
most privacy legislation, have been defined by Langheinrich [31]
to guide the design of AmI systems. They are: Notice, i.e., users
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should be aware of what data are collected about them, Choice and
Consent, Anonymity and Pseudonymity, Proximity and Locality, Ad-
equate Security, and Access and Recourse. Wang and Kobsa [44]
extend Langheinrich’s principles with the 23 most frequently ad-
dressed principles in privacy laws and regulations, among which,
access/participation, anonymity and choice/consent. The authors list
is prompted by the observation that privacy-protecting laws exist in
more than 40 countries, and typically viewing privacy from different
perspectives. For example, in the US privacy is mostly self-regulated,
whereas in the EU privacy is considered as a human right.
To encode privacy policies into human- and machine-readable for-
mats, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) developed the Plat-
form for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) 2. Unfortunately, there
has been, so far, insufficient support from current web browser imple-
menters. Similar approaches, like SPARCLE [27], or XACML [18],
still have to demonstrate the practicality of their solutions. Their am-
biguity, both for users and software, and lack of expressiveness keep
many privacy regulations out of their scope. A shortcoming of these
methods is the purely declarative nature of their policy language [1].
Currently, major threats to privacy come from personal data ag-
gregation and the increasing power of data mining. The magnitude of
the information sources and the potential to combine these sources to
create a person’s profile threaten individual privacy [28].
In this paper, the question we address is which specific privacy
issues are raised in AmI environments and what are, currently, the
proposed solutions to preserve privacy when it is threatened. This
breaks down into:1) what are the definitions of privacy? 2) Which
threats are specific to AmI? and 3) How is privacy preserved?
We use a literature review in the areas of ethics, law and com-
puter science, then, proceed with critical discussions. We illustrate
our findings with a scenario from a domain in which privacy plays
a central role: Ambient Assisted Living (AAL), ICT-based solutions
for the self-management of senior citizens in daily life activities at
home. AAL addresses the problem of an aging population, which
has become a main concern for many countries to insure quality of
life and medical care, security and conviviality [8] to their citizens.
In this work we do not provide analytical solutions to privacy
threats, nor do we cover every possible aspects of privacy. In particu-
lar, we do not include privacy in voting [22], encryption [3] nor phys-
ical approaches to privacy preservation, such as the Faraday cage ap-
proach [25] for RFID privacy issues, or privacy at the level of Wire-
less Sensor Networks [32].
The layout of this paper is as follows. We first, introduce our moti-
vating scenario Chapter 2. We then present privacy definitions, Chap-
ter 3, privacy issues in Chapter 4, and most common privacy preserv-
ing approaches in Chapter 5. We conclude in Chapter 6.
2 http://www.w3.org/P3P/
2 MOTIVATING SCENARIO
Frank is a 70-year-old Alzheimer patient, who lives alone. His
daughter, Jane, lives just a few blocks away. Usually, Frank visits
Jane once or twice a week. Due to his condition, Frank has installed
a Home Care System (HCS) in case he finds himself in a critical
situation, and to urgently notify Jane or his friends. He also wears
a health-bracelet, measuring his heart-beat, body temperature, and
daily distance covered. The bracelet is connected to his smartphone,
which also has a GPS and a HCS application installed. The HCS ap-
plication can send vital information, such as bracelet data and current
location to Frank’s HCS. The HCS has a record with Frank’s profile,
such as name, age, address, and medical profile, as well as a list of
contacts for emergency notifications. Finally, Frank carries an RFID
card to verify his location. For example, Frank and Jane both have an
RFID reader inside their houses: whenever Frank is near one of these
readers, his location is verified.
Today, Frank is visiting Jane. He leaves his home (Figure 1, state
1) and walks to Jane’s house. Suddenly, he realizes that he has been
wandering about and is lost (Figure 1, state 2). He is becoming anx-
ious. His heart is beating faster. He is sweating. Frank presses the
emergency button on his bracelet and an alarm is sent to the HCS via
his HCS smartphone application. The HCS infers that Frank is lost:
he has been away from home for too long and has not yet checked
in Jane’s house. Jane is the person from the emergency list whose
address is closest to Frank’s current location. Thus the HCS notifies
Jane about Frank’s current location. The HCS also sets up Frank’s
smartphone voice navigator application to guide him to Jane. If Jane
does not respond within five minutes, the HCS notifies the local hos-
pital about the situation, providing Frank’s medical file and current
location. Finally, Jane found Frank and led him to her house with
safety (Figure 1, state 3). Figure 2 depicts the connected devices.
Figure 1. Frank, an Alzheimer patient, gets lost on his way to Jane’s house
Figure 2. Connected devices
3 DEFINITIONS OF PRIVACY
The notion of privacy has been discussed extensively, not only over
the last decades, but even from the 19th century. Still no globally
accepted definition has been provided. Warren and Brandeis[45] are
usually credited the definition of privacy as “the right to be let alone”,
which was actually a reference to Thomas Cooley’s “Treatise on the
Law of Torts”[10], written twelve years earlier, in 1878. The need for
such a right emerged from the “unauthorized circulation of portraits
of private persons”, performed by the newspaper enterprises which
used instantaneous photographs. As times changed, so did technol-
ogy and its ability to intrude into people’s lives. Consequently, the
definition of privacy had to follow the times and incorporate these
new ways of intrusion.
Some other relatively “simple” descriptions, like “exclusive access
of a person to a realm of his or her own”, or “control over informa-
tion about oneself”, even if helpful in introducing the notion of pri-
vacy, are not enough to explicitly define it. For example, there could
exist many perceptions of the “realm of oneself”, or the ways that
someone can have “control over information”. At the end, defining
privacy depends on the problem of defining personal information,
or even personality, notions that are mostly met on social sciences,
rather than computer science. So, most definitions of privacy, if not
all, take for granted (explicitly or implicitly) that these notions are
well defined.
Improvements towards more specificity include Alan Westing’s
definition of privacy as “the ability of people to determine for them-
selves when, how, and to what extent information about them is com-
municated to others” [46] and Stefanos Gritzalis’ as “the indefeasible
right of an individual to control the ways in which personal informa-
tion is obtained, processed, distributed, shared, and used by any other
entity”[20]. Even if the latter definitions are more explicit, they still
rely on the term “personal information”, which can be again subjec-
tive. The Data Protection Directive defines personal data as “any in-
formation relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (the
data subject)”. In determining whether information concerns an iden-
tifiable person, one must apply recital 26 of the Data Protection Di-
rective, which says that “account should be taken of all the means
likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other
person to identify the said person”. Such a definition implies a broad
understanding of the notion of personal data, which may consist of
all sorts of information as soon as they relate to the individual [47].
Lately, there have been so many ways in which one’s privacy can
be violated, that further distinction between different types of pri-
vacy needs to be made. Location privacy, for example, has been a
major concern in the last few years. It can be defined, by paraphras-
ing Alan Westing’s privacy definition, as “a special type of informa-
tion privacy which concerns the claim of individuals to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent location information about
them is communicated to others” [14], or simpler as “the ability to
prevent other parties from learning ones current or past location”
[4]. In [39] some popular applications (Google Latitude, Facebook
Places, and Glympse) are compared, with respect to their support for
location privacy. Krumm finishes his survey on location privacy [29],
stating that “progress in computational location privacy depends on
the ability to quantify location privacy” and also noting that there was
not a standard for quantifying location privacy at that time. Location-
Privacy Meter, presented in [41] is an interesting tool to measure lo-
cation privacy. Other types of privacy that need to be protected, as
suggested in [28], include bodily privacy, territorial privacy, privacy
of communications and information privacy.
Other approaches to the definition of privacy also include the idea
of free, uninfluenced decision making about one’s self. Kupfer [30]
states that “privacy enables control over personal information as well
as control over our bodies and personal choices for our concept of
self”, making privacy subjective to every person’s own “concept of
self”. DeCew [13] suggests that privacy is a cluster concept covering
interests in i) control over information about oneself, ii) control over
access to oneself, both physical and mental, and iii) control over
one’s ability to make important decisions about family and lifestyle
in order to be self-expressive and to develop varied relationships.
Privacy seems to be a culturally relative right, but this doesn’t
mean that it is completely subjective [36]. For instance, privacy is
considered to be a commodity in the US (since it relies on self-
regulation) whereas in the EU it is a human right. To bridge this gap
and allow US companies do business in the EU and conform to the
EU Privacy Directive, EU and US arrived at an agreement, known as
the safe harbor agreement. This agreements offers a convenient way
of complying with the adequacy requirements of the EU Directive
[42]. Privacy has nowadays become a commodity, in the sense that
the consumer makes a non-monetary exchange of their personal in-
formation for value such as higher quality service and personalized
offers or discounts [11].
Table 1 presents our summary categorization of the different ap-
proaches to defining privacy that have been discussed in this section.
Privacy has been defined as a right, an elabler to controling personal
data and, lately, as a commodity expressed through privacy policies
of commercial products. This categorization is not in a chronological
order, in the sense that privacy was seen as a right in the 19th cen-
tury, but it can be still defined as such. However, it can be seen as
a chronological categorization of the value of privacy, as it has been
understood or used. It was introduced as an aspect of personal liberty,
then it became an ability to control personal information and lately it
has been used as a way to exchange personal information for a better
service, or other commercial offers.
Right Enabler Commodity
-to be let alone [45]
-to control the ways
in which personal
information is
obtained, processed,
distributed, shared,
and used [20]
-to determine when,
how, and to what
extent personal
information is
communicated to
others [46]
-control over personal
information as well as
over our bodies and
personal choices [30]
-a non-monetary
exchange of
consumers’ personal
information for value
such as higher quality
service and
personalized offers or
discounts [11].
Table 1. Categorization of privacy definitions
4 PRIVACY ISSUES IN AMI
Here we discuss the privacy problems that our scenario entails, as
well as more privacy issues, typically encountered in AmI systems.
4.1 Geolocation
Geolocation can be used to breach the location privacy of a person.
It is usually a problem, when past locations of a person are stored.
As illustrated in [4], people probably do not care if someone finds
out where they were a week ago at a specific time, but if someone
could inspect the history of all their past movements, then they might
start to see things differently. However, this is not always the case,
since, even a single record of someone’s location at a specific time
can cause privacy concerns. For example, if someone is spotted in
a cancer clinic, or in the office of Alcoholics Anonymous, or in a
police department, then privacy could also be breached, since logical
(probabilistic) assumptions could be made about this person.
In our scenario, Frank’s location can be identified either by ex-
ploiting RFID privacy issues, or by acquiring, legally or not, the data
stored by the HCS. For example, someone who knows that Frank
lives alone and that he is currently far from home, could easily break
into Frank’s house, or even physically attack and rob him. Less dan-
gerous privacy breaches include knowing Frank’s wherabouts and
habits, for marketing purposes, or even for surveilance reasons.
4.2 RFID Privacy Issues
RFID cards are widely used today in electronic passports, bus tickets,
employee access cards, toll roads/parking access etc.; practically, on
anything that needs to be identified. In some cases, RFID cards carry
vital information, as in the case of electronic passports, such as name,
age, address, marital status, signature, id photo etc. Other times they
just carry an identification number.
In his survey[23], Juels analyzes how RFID raises two main pri-
vacy concerns: clandestine tracking and inventorying. “RFID tags
respond to reader interrogation without alerting their owners or bear-
ers. Thus, where read range permits, clandestine scanning of tags is
a plausible threat.” When the RFID tag also has information about
the manufacturer, or the cardholder, then they are subject to invento-
rying. For example, an adversary could know the contents of one’s
bag, the amount of money he carries, the type of medication he car-
ries, and therefore what illness he may suffer from, where he shops,
his accessory preferences etc.
In our scenario, we have considered the simplest case, in which
Frank’s RFID card just carries an id number. Of course, this id num-
ber can be easily connected to Frank, since he is the only one who
holds this specific card. If Frank simply passes by an RFID reader,
placed by an adversary, similar to the one he has in his house, or in
Jane’s house, then he could easily be identified at the place of this
reader. If Frank’s card also included personal information, as in e-
passports, then all these information could be at risk [24].
4.3 Patient Privacy
Lately, there has been a significant increase in the digital medical
data being recorded by healthcare organizations. “While the health-
care industry has benefited from information sharing, patients are
increasingly concerned about invasion of their privacy by these prac-
tices. These growing concerns on privacy led to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 2001 and have in-
creased compliance requirements for health-care organizations” [33].
Vital information for Frank’s health is stored and exchanged by
the HCS, his phone, his bracelet, Jane and the local hospital. This
information can be acquired by third parties, by using data mining
techniques. Typically, there are three parties involved in the privacy
problem in data mining [33]: i.) the data owner (the organization
that owns the data) who wants to discover knowledge from the data
without compromising the confidentiality of the data, ii.) individuals
who provide their personal information to the data owner and want
their privacy protected and iii.) the third party data user who has
access to the data released by the data owner.
This third party can be an individual data miner (either insider or
outsider to the data owner), or an organization that has a data shar-
ing agreement with the data owner. In our example, the local hospital
could be the third party, or even a medical company that has a data
sharing agreement with the hospital. Even if the data sent to the third
party are de-anonymized, they can be combined with publicly avail-
able data and still identify the refered individual.
Another interesting source of privacy breach iw provided by peo-
ple who are authorized to access patient data. “Recent studies have
revealed that numerous policy violations occur in the real world as
employees access records of celebrities, family members, and neigh-
bors motivated by general curiosity, financial gain, child custody law-
suits and other considerations” [5].
4.4 Personal Data Leackage
Personal data, namely any information relating to an identified or
identifiable person, could be considered as a superset of patient data.
Combinations of few characteristics can be used to uniquely or nearly
uniquely identify some individuals. It is discussed in [43] that 87% of
the population in the United States had reported characteristics that
likely made them unique based only on ZIP code, gender and date
of birth. For example, just by buying the voter registration list for
Cambridge Massachusetts and having a copy of publicly available,
anonymized, patient-specific data, Sweeney could identify the pa-
tient record of the governor of Massachussetts at that time. “Clearly,
data released containing such information about these individuals
should not be considered anonymous. Yet, health and other person-
specific data are often publicly available in this form.” A similar ex-
ample was provided in [37], which presents a framework that an-
alyzes privacy and anonymity in social networks and re-identifies
anonymized social network graphs. A third of the users who could
be verified to have accounts on both Twitter and Flickr, could be re-
identified in the anonymous Twitter graph with only a 12% error rate.
In our scenario, Frank’s age, address, medical profile, health data,
whereabouts, marital status etc. could be available to third parties, by
data aggregation, without Frank’s explicit authorization.
4.5 Unauthorized Actions
As discussed in chapter 3, some definitions of privacy also include
the aspect of control over personal choices. When Frank decides to
push the button on his bracelet, he implicitly gives authorization to
his HCS to take action. However, there could be a case, in which he
does not push the button and the HCS realizes that there is an emer-
gency. If the HCS is programmed to call for help and share Frank’s
medical profile, then that could be a breach of his privacy.
Even if Frank agrees to share his medical record, there is also an
issue regarding the recipient of this information. Frank could accept
sharing this information with the local hospital, but disapprove shar-
ing the same information with his daughter. To avoid such kind of
conflicts, authorization rules have to be predefined by Frank.
4.6 Discussion
In this section we have seen ways in which Frank’s privacy could be
breached. By recording Frank’s past locations, an adversary could in-
fer important information about Frank’s personal life. Even by know-
ing Frank’s current location, an adversary could physically attack
him, or break into his house. If an RFID card is used, then again
Frank could be spotted. Moreover, if this RFID card carries personal
information, or if multiple RFID cards are used for things Frank car-
ries with him, then these data could be at risk. Vital information
about Frank’s health, stored and transmitted by his devices, could
be acquired by third parties without his authorization. Data aggrega-
tion could make it possible for an adversary to infer Frank’s personal
data, like his age, address, medical profile, marital status etc. Finally,
Frank’s own HCS could breach his privacy, by taking important de-
cisions about Frank’s life, without his approval.
5 PRESERVING PRIVACY
In this section we present some typical approaches to preserve pri-
vacy. Even if these approaches are not solely focusing on AmI sys-
tems, correlating them with such systems is trivial. When necessary,
we use our scenario from chapter 2 to illustrate how the presented
approach could be applied in AmI systems.
We have divided this section in two categories; the first one is for
data that can be accessed, but not in their original form, and the sec-
ond mainly focuses on techniques that will provide personal infor-
mation to a specific group of people, while hide it from anyone else.
There are also other approaches, like auditing mechanisms [5], which
could complement privacy policies.
5.1 Modifying Available Data
Privacy issues occur when someone’s personal data become avail-
able, against this person’s will. However, there is no issue at all when
the same personal data is available, but without the possibility, or,
to be more realistic, with a very small chance of connecting them to
this person. For example, it is certainly a breach of privacy to know
that your neighbour, Frank, has the Alzheimer’s disease, when Frank
doesn’t want you to know that. However, Frank would have no prob-
lem if it was publicly available that someone with the pseudonym X
suffers Alzheimer’s disease. The property of being indistinguishable
among a set of individuals is called anonymity. The problem is that
even anonymized data can be combined and finally identify who X
is. There is no privacy issue, either, to know that a person with the
pseudonym X, lives on 24, Monterey street. But if we know that the
same person always gets the same pseudonym, then we can easily in-
fer that the person who lives on 24, Monterey street suffers from the
Alzheimer’s disease and in a similar manner that his name is Frank.
A very popular approach during the last decade was the notion of
k-anonymity [43]. In a k-anonymized dataset, each record is indis-
tinguishable from at least k - 1 other records with respect to certain
identifying attributes. However, a more recent work [34], introducing
`-diversity, has proven that k-anonymity does not guarantee privacy
against attackers using background knowledge.
Dwork [15, 16] introduces, and describes a mechanism achiev-
ing the notion of differential privacy. It is based on Dalenius’ [12]
desideratum for statistical databases, which states that nothing about
an individual should be learnable from the database that cannot be
learned without access to the database.
A completely different approach is presented in [40]. The Personal
Data Stream (PDS) is designed to give users new data management
tools, based on three foundational design principles: primacy of par-
ticipants, data legibility, and engagement of participants throughout
the data life cycle. With the PDS, the participants are in control of
their data, able to make privacy decisions. A prerequisite for this ap-
proach is that participants should be able to understand what the data
mean and reveal about them.
5.2 Data Access: A Logical Approach
Solutions to privacy based on logic, mainly focus on permissions to
access data (authorization problem). Following the definitions of pri-
vacy, it should be the persons whose data are shared that decide who
will receive their personal data, either directly, e.g. by being asked, or
even just aware each time their data is broadcasted, or indirectly, by
agreeing upon a privacy policy. In each case, they should always be in
a position to control the flow of their personal data. In our scenario,
this kind of privacy preservation would include Frank participating
in the design of his HCS privacy policy, by stating his privacy prefer-
ences. For example, he could state that only his personal doctor can
have access to his medical profile and, in the case of an emergency,
this access could be also granted to any other doctor in duty. This
would prohibit Jane from viewing Frank’s medical profile.
DEAL [19] is a formal high-level authorization language, aiming
to specify access control policies in open and dynamic distributed
systems. It supports negative authorization, rule priorities, hierarchi-
cal category authorization and nonmonotonic reasoning.
Aucher et al. [1, 2] also study how to formally specify and reason
about privacy policies in terms of permitted and forbidden knowl-
edge by using epistemic logic and deontic logic, branches of modal
logic. The requirements the authors set on languages for specify-
ing and reasoning about privacy policies are that by using such lan-
guages, one should be able to: i.) distinguish between a permission to
know and the permission to send a message, ii.) specify and reason
about the order in which messages can be sent, iii.)specify obliga-
tions in privacy policies and iv.) express meta-security policies.
The Coprelobri (computers and privacy regulations: the logical
bridge) project [1], is built on a logical language that can be used
to represent and reason on privacy policies. It could be used to
provide writing assistance to lawyers in charge of making privacy
policies, regulations and law. It could also be used to check that a
given policy is compliant with a set of high-level regulations. Deon-
tic Logic for Privacy (DLP logic) [38] is a normal deontic temporal
language, which can represent information about personal data usage
and protection. DLP can deal with deontico-temporal notions which
are prominent in privacy-related regulations.
Collaboration and privacy are two competing concepts. Kanovich
et al. [26] discuss the interplay between confidentiality, or policy
compliance, and goal reachability. The authors focus on the research
question whether the agents can achieve their common goal while
having some confidentiality guarantees. “The main confidentiality
concern is that data might become available or visible to an agent
who is prohibited from viewing it according to one of the policies.”
It is assummed that each agent has a data confidentiality policy which
specifies which pieces of data other agents are prohibited from learn-
ing. Affine Logic (AL) is used to model the reachability of partial
goals, because it allows working with the relevant resources in arbi-
trary contexts.
PROTUNE (Provisional Trust Negotiation) [6] is a system for
specifying and cooperatively enforcing security and privacy policies.
Protune relies on logic programming for representing policies and
for reasoning with and about them. “The use of set of Horn rules
for policies together with ontologies provide the advantage of well-
defined semantics and machine interoperability, hence allowing for
automated negotiations.” In Protune, policies are basically sets of
Horn rules, on which the system has to perform several kinds of
symbolic manipulations such as deduction, abduction, and filtering.
“Policies are monotonic in the sense that, as more credentials are re-
leased and more actions executed, the set of permissions does not
decrease.” Protune introduces a mechanism for answering why, why-
not, how-to, and what-if queries on rule-based policies.This mecha-
nism aims to help common users become aware of the policy applied
by the systems they interact with and even take control over it.
In [21], a semantically rich, policy-based framework that con-
strains the information flow in a context-aware system is presented.
It uses an OWL ontology to represent dynamic aspects of context-
aware systems and a combination of OWL-DL and Jena rules speci-
fying the policy to perform reasoning. It enforces user’s privacy pref-
erences using static information about the user as well as dynamic
information observed and inferred from the context. “Privacy pref-
erences are access control rules that describe how a user wants to
share which information, with whom, and under what conditions.”
This framework provides users with appropriate levels of privacy to
protect the personal information, including the possible inferences
from this information, on their mobile devices.
5.3 Discussion
It should be clarified that the two approaches to preserve privacy,
presented in this chapter are not used for the same purpose. Data
masking/ anonymizing etc is typically used when the personal data
are expected to be accessed by third parties. For example, a hospital
that wants to share scientific data, based on patient records, while at
the same time preserve the patients’ privacy, would use one of these
solutions. In other words data masking is all about what kind of data
will a third party have access to. On the other hand, the authorization
problem is about decidingwhowill have access to personal, typically
not anonymized data. However, a combination of these approaches
would be interesting, since we would expect to have control of who
has access and to what type of data.
6 CONCLUSION
With the pervasiveness of AmI systems, privacy issues and how to
preserve own’s own privacy has become key. In this paper we raise
the question of which specific issues and solutions are currently used
in AmI environment. First, to understand how the concept of pri-
vacy has been used up to now, we present the privacy definitions
put forward in the literature. We note the multi-faceted aspect of the
concept, ranging from being a “right to be let alone” [10, 45], to en-
abling “control over personal information” [30, 13, 46], to a mere
“commodity” [11]. We then, present and discuss the most common
privacy issues pertaining to AmI environments. We find that geoloca-
tion could become a very serious privacy breach, especially when a
history of locations is recoreded. RFID is a promising way of identi-
fication, but information stored in an RFID tag can be at risk, if RFID
security is not thoroughly designed. Patient data can be acquired by
third parties with data aggregation techniques, even from publicly
available, anonymized data. Finally, we describe the two most com-
mon approaches used to preserve privacy, namely by modifying the
available data and providing authorization mechanisms. These ap-
proaches answer to two different questions, namely what kind of
data can a third party acquire and who can acquire private data re-
spectively. However, they can be combined and enable control over
both these questions. Throughout our paper, we illustrate how these
issues and techniques may arise in a real-life situation with a moti-
vating scenario validated by the HotCity of Luxembourg set in the
Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) domain.
In future works, we will include privacy in the context of AAL
and AmI systems and perform reasoning on the authorization prob-
lems. Additionally, in order to respect users’ privacy preferences and
endow the system with user-friendliness and conviviality, we will ad-
dress the trade-offs that must be done for an AmI system to be both
private and convivial.
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